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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPHINE o. GARRAND, for
herself and as Guardian Ad Litem
for JOSEPH PHILLIP GARRAND,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

/

vs.

Case No. 16622

LEONARD J. GARRAND,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought for support of an incapacitated
child, now over the age of twenty-one (21) years, pursuant to
Sections 78-45-3 and 4, u.c.A. (1953).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court held that the plaintiff had pursue4
appropriate procedure and required defendant to pay $150

p8Z'

month for the support of the child and awarded $300
fees and costs (R. 51).
The defendant had moved
ground that the divorce decree in civil action No.
Third District Court was

~

judicata
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motion prayed alternatively for consolidation of the divorce
action with this action.

The Motion to Dismiss was denied and

the Court ordered consolidation of action No. 186725 into this
action No. 78-6783, and that all subsequent pleadings and proceedings be under No. 78-6783 (R. 16 and 17).
Paragraph 4 of defendant's Answer (R. 18) sought to
raise again the issue of !!!. judicata.

The Motion to Strike

made by the plaintiff (R. 21) was granted (R. 32).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The testimony at the trial has not been transcribed.
Appellant's Statement of Facts must, therefore, be limited to
the pleadings and other court records and there are no record
references to any of the statements in appellant's Statement of
Facts.

Likewise, as to the material on pages 5 and 6, these

are largely gratuitous statements not supported by any references
and not supportable in the testimony because that has not been
transcribed.
The Notice of Appeal was captioned in Case No. 186725
(R. 261) and respondent, therefore, submits that the issue on
appeal is limited to the ruling of Judge Croft that the decision
in No. 186725 was not !!!. judicata of the action under 78-45-3 ~d
4 (R. 259 and see R. 57 in# C78-6783).
Appellant sought an interlocutory appeal from that
ruling.

Appellant's petition is not in the record, but the
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objections of respondent to that petition have been included
(R. 43-46).

This matter was given Case No. 16303 in the Supreme

Court.
The Notice of Appeal having been given in civil action
No. 18672S (R. 261 in that record), the Affidavit of the respondent
appearing in No. 18672S at R. 263-264 must be ignored, since the
District Court no longer had jurisdiction of that action.

That

is the sense of the respondent's Motion to Dismiss that petition
dated September 7, 1979, which also appears in the transcript
of No. 18672S (R. 266).
The District Court awarded attorney's fees in this
matter (R. SS) and respondent requests that additional attorney's
fees be allowed for the handling of this appeal, in the event
the Judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
POINTS RELIED ON
Point I.

The trial court was right in denying appellant's

Motion to Dismiss based on the doctrine of !!! judicata.
Point II.

Appellant's point that the order of the Court

is inequitable cannot be considered in the absence of the transcript
of testimony.
Point III.

This Court should allow additional attorney's

fees to the respondent.
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POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS RIGHT IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS BASED
ON THE DOCTRINE OF ~ JUDICATA
In divorce actions in Utah, the Court has continuing
jurisdiction as to matters of support for children.

Section

30-3-5 (1), u.c.A. (1953, As Amended).
Josephine Garrand brought an Order to Show Cause on
for hearing before the District Court on April 12, 1977 (R. 191
in 186725).

The minute entry of the Court states:

"The Court holds that the defendant is entitled
to receive support for the boy until he reaches
t,he age of 21 and orders the plaintiff to continue
until that time. The child support on the boy
will be increased to $240 per month ($190 for
April) until he reaches 21 years of age, at which
time it will terminate. 11
Finding of Fact No. 3 recited that Joseph would become
21 years of age on November 15, 1977 (R. 193), and Conclusion of
Law No. 4 states:
"4. Under the original Decree in this action, the
obligation for support continued as to the son
Joseph until he reached age twenty-one, which
matter continues to be justiciable under the
amendment to Section 15-2-1, u.c.A. 1953, by
this Court and because of special circumstances
as to Joseph, the support should continue to
age twenty-one. 11 (R. 196)
And the Decree makes the support for Joseph continue:
" • • • through November, 1977 shall be payable
on the first of each month."
The statute which Judge Banks was applying was enacted in 1975
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and provides:
"15-2-1. The period of minority extends in
males and females to the aqe of 18 years1
but all minors obtain their majority by
marriaqe. It is further provided that courts
in divorce actions may order support to aqe 21."
u.c.A. (1953, As Amended).
Dehm v. Dehm (Januarr 14, 1976), 545 P.2d 525, considered Section 30-3-5 and holds that the court has continuinq
jurisdiction on support matters and also considered Section
78-45-3 and 4 as well as 78-45-2(4), which defines a child as a
son or dauqhter under the aqe of 21 years:
"· •• or a son or dauqhter of whatever aqe who
is incapacitated from earninq a livinq and without sufficient means."
Section 15-2-1 was not before the court in
arose before the amendment to the statute.

.!!!!!!!!•
.!!!!!!!!

as that action
holds that support

for an incapacitated child over 21 can be obtained in a divorce
action or in an action under Chapter 45 of Title 78 (P. 528).
Judqe Banks placed his decision under Section 15-2-1, which pre•
scribed the jurisdiction of the divorce court to continuing support
until the period of minority is past.
It is, therefore, plain that Chapter 45 of Title 78 was
not before Judqe Banks1 there was no issue as to support beyond
aqe 211 and Judqe Banks made no findinq or conclusion or provisiQD
in the Decree to preclude application for support for
tated child.
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When Joseph turned 21, there were two alternatives to
get support:

Plaintiff could have re-opened the divorce action

under Dehm, supra, or could have proceeded under Chapter 45 of
Title 78 as, in fact, she did.

The decision in Dehm was a

three to two decision, and the reasoning suggests plainly that
the better approach to the problem is to treat childhood as
terminating at age 21 and to proceed on a different theory and
a different cause of action thereafter.
With this background, appellant raises the question of
whether

~

judicata applies to this proceeding.

He correctly

refers to Searle Brothers v. Searle as a late pronouncement on
this subject.

three tests to determine whether
(1)

'

It is reported at 588 P .2d 689.
~

Searle establishes'

judicata applies.

They are:

The same parties or their privies: (2) the same cause of

action: (3) attempt to relitigate all issues that could have been
litigated or were in fact litigated (P. 690).

Dehm, supra,

establishes that there are two causes of action, one under the
divorce statute and one under the Civil Liability for Support
Act, 78-45-3 and 4, u.c.A. (1953, As Amended).

Judge Banks

limited himself to the cause of action under the divorce proceeding and Section 15-2-1 and the liability after age 21 was
not before the Court.

~

judicata does not apply.

Appellant urges collateral estoppel if
does not apply.

~

judicata

Searle at page 691 establishes four tests for
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application of collateral estoppel:
"l. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the
action in question?
"2.

Was there a final judgment on the merits?

"3. Was the party against whom the plea is
asserted a party or in privity with the party
to the prior adjudication? * * *
"Fourth test: 'Was the issue in the first
case competently, fully and fairly litigated?'n
Respondent does not contend that Test No. 3 was not
satisfied, since the plaintiff here is acting for the son as·his
guardian and appeared by herself but actually in the son's behalf
in the divorc·e action.

But the other tests fail.

The first test fails because the issue in the divorce
action was to determine need for support while the child was under
age 21 with no litigation of the child's need as an adult and
incapacitated child.

The Findings and Conclusions disclose that.

The second test also failed because there was no final
judgment on the status of the child and the need for support for
him under the Civil Liability for Support Act after he· reached
the age of 21.
There is failure of the fourth test also because there
is no evidence that the issue as to the child's status and
after age 21 was before the Court or was considered by
or was anything except left
The factual situation in Searle, supra,
ferent and of no help.

The factual situation in
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-squite similar and holds that two alternative routes were available,
Respondent submits that if a person becomes an adult at age 18
but that minority may be extended to 21 for a male child, it is ,
forcing language to treat an adult as a "child".

Particularly

is this true when the majority of courts, according to Dehm,
terminate the jurisdiction of the divorce court at the majority
of children, in the absence of a specific statute.

The specific

statute in Utah places incapacitated children under the Civil
Liability for Support Act, 78-45-2, 3 and 4.
A significant difference in the causes of action is
noted in the

F~ndings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

In the

proceeding to modify the order in the divorce action and increase '
the support money, the Findings of Fact show the increase in needs
of the child and the ability of the father to pay (R. 193-199 of
186725).

On the other hand, the Findings of Fact in this pro-

ceeding share the expense between the father and the mother

and

make Findings of Fact both as to the ability of the plaintiff to
pay and the ability of the defendant to pay, apparently dividing
the expense equally between the parties.
POINT II
APPELLANT'S POINT THAT THE ORDER OF THE COURT
IS INEQUITABLE CANNOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE
ABSENCE OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 52-53
of C78-6783) support the Decree, requiring the defendant to
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pay approximately half of the support for Joseph commencing with
June, 1979, and in the absence of the transcript of testimony,
there is no basis for attacking these Findings of Fact and
the order consequent thereon.
POINT III
THIS COURT SHOULD ALLOW ADDITIONAL
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE RESPONDENT
The trial court awarded $300 to the plaintiff for the
use of her attorney (R. 53 and 55).
The defendant brought the matter to this Court on a
petition for interlocutory appeal, in which plaintiff's attorney
filed a responsive pleading and memorandum (R. 43-46 of C78-6783).
This Court has discretion to award attorney's fees on
appeal.

~

v. Bates (Utah 1977), 560 P.2d 7061

2!.!!!!.

v.

~

Lake Real Estate (1955), 3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P.2d 709.
CONCLUSION
Since the Court has continuing jurisdiction in child
support matters, and presumably has similar continuing jurisdiction in civil liability for support cases, the doctrine of
~

judicata does not have application to this type of case.
And if the tests for application of the doctrine of

res judicata and of collateral estoppel were applied to this
case, the application would fail because this is a different
cause of action, because the issue here litigated was not decided
previously, Joseph now being a.~ adult, and the issue of fixing
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the burden of what appears to be permanent support between father
and mother was not litigated previously.

Plaintiff was confronud

with a choice of proceeding under the divorce action or under the
statute for civil liability support of a handicapped child and
made what appeared then and now to be the more reasonable choice,
'l'he Court should award additional attorney's fees to be fixed on
remand to the District Court.
DATED this

I :,-,J day of November, 1979.

Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD L. BIRD, JR. ·, , ,

333 East Fourth south Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent

Received copies of the within Brief this

~~-

day of

November, 1979.

Attorney for Appellant
431 South 3rd East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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